Recently, the US Army has been confronted by a wider range of military and peacekeeping operations. The future success of the Army on tomorrow's battlefields depends, in part, on how effectively our forces are able to fight and win the information war. We present a computer simulation approach being developed for the 'Army Digitization Office (ADO) for reengineering the current stove-piped organization of tactical Army staffs into staffs organized for information operations in the 2 1 st century.
INTRODUCTION
World events of recent years have required the United States armed forces to respond to a much broader range of military operations involving both joint and coalition forces. Examples include Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and, most recently, Bosnia. Published accounts of the operations reveal at least two interrelated factors that combined to complicate the Army's command and control (C*) processes (see, for example, Campen 1992, (Josephson and Macedonia 1994) , (Sullivan 1994) ). First, the infusion of communications, computer and information technology at all levels across the Army during the late 1980s and early 1990s increasingly overloaded commanders and staffs with battlefield information that bogged down the military decision making process. Second, both political and military considerations motivated commanders at all levels to accelerate the military decision making processes leading to military action that accelerated the operational tempo.
Former Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, recognized these problems and, in 1994, set a new course for the Army when he initiated an Armywide effort supported by the Army Staff, branch schools, major commands and battle laboratories to design and field the Army of the early 21st century, or FORCE XXZ.
According to General Sullivan, "FORCE XXI must be organized around information --the creation and sharing of knowledge followed by un@ied action based on that knowledge which will allow commanders to apply power effectively (Sullivan 1994) ."
For Army commanders to win decisively on tomorrow's battlefields, they must make well-informed, timely decisions to give the land combat forces adequate guidance and sufficient time to carefully and thoroughly plan the military operation, and fight and win the battle. Winning decisively on tomorrow's high-technology battlefield will require reengineering the traditional, stove-piped tactical Army staffs from battalion through division into staffs organized for information operations that can win the information war.
We present a computer simulation approach under development for the Army Digitization Office (ADO), Headquarters, Department of the Army, for reengineering the way that staffs are currently organized into staffs organized for information operations in the 21st century. The major purposes of this paper are to: 1. overview work-in-progress on the development of a computer simulation model for this project; and 2. discuss preliminary simulation results comparing proposed FORCE XXI staffs organized for information operations based op the concepts of a command and control system (C System), a modular force structure (MFS) and various levels of information and military technology.
By design, the simulation model will permit Army FORCE XXI developers to evaluate potential staff organization alternatives ahead of time and to examine the implications of these alternatives on officer professional development in terms of identifying future skills required of officers to properly man the FORCE XXI staffs. Attendant problems associated with developing and using the computer simulation approach to reengineer staffs for information operations are also discussed. generalization of a C System capable of providing effective command and control of military forces engaged in anv of the land operation and operating environment listed above; and specialization of modular FORCE XXI combat forces by operation and geographical environment that tailors the modular forces ahead of time for different land operations and geographical environments (i.e., regions of the world) based on potential threats to U.S. national security. Within this, the use of a copputer simulation model to design the staffs of the C System and the modular combat forces is discussed next.
3BACKGROUND
To fight and win the information war, commanders and staffs at all levels must effectively manage both battlefield information and time for planning and executing the military operation. The FORCE XXI initiative includes the horizontal and vertical integration of new age information technology across the forces to enhance command and control of land combat forces. Information technology will unquestionably2accelerate the operational tempo by compressing the C cycle for military operations of Figure 1 where information operations feed military decision making resulting in military action.
R.I ilitary Action
The implications seem obvious: the faster that information is collected, processed and disseminated to battle commanders, the faster that commanders will make decisions leading to military action, leaving less time for thinking about complex decision problems and making synchronization of fire and maneuver much more challenging.
From a military viewpoint, the responsibility for command and control rests with the commander. In practice, however, the commander relies extensively upon principal staff officers to accomplish many tasks associated with the command function. In general, the staff functions (and positions) include those activities that focus on controlling forces. Traditionally, the staff has been organized as follows: personnel and administration (GI/S l), intelligence (G2/S2), plans and operations (G3/S3) and logistics (G4/S4). In the past, commanders and staffs have relied upon written and verbal messages as well as voice radio traffic for military decision making, communicating orders and maintaining tactical control of forces. In addition, the battlefield situation, often referred to as the relevant common picture (RCP), is the commander's mental picture of the battlefield that he communicates verbally and in writing to his staff and subordinate commanders. In the past, commanders have generally relied on staffs to manually process battlefield information needed for updating their mental models of the battlefield and to keep abreast of the military situation. A "typical" Army division headquarters includes three command posts (CPs): Tactical, Main and Rear responsible for controlling all aspects of division operations. Until very recently, the vast majority of battlefield information at the tactical level (Division and below) was communicated by voice.
The Army is presently testing and, in some cases, fielding new communications and decision support systems for tactical level commanders (division and below). For example, the Army is fielding a Tactical Local Area Network, or TACLAN, for Division operations that provides electronic communications between the three command posts mentioned above as well as establishing links to senior and subordinate headquarters. Messages between different staff elements are transmitted over tactical switches. The system is supported by fifteen to thirty personal computers that serve as communications nodes for the staff sections of the various command posts. Messages are passed electronically between the nodes (Le., within and between the command posts) and may be passed between outside elements as well. Additionally, the nodes may also receive communications from FM and satellite radio nets, telephone calls over tactical switches and hand carried messages. However, at the present time, all of the information must be manually processed before it is available for use by either the staff or the commander .
Clearly, as the operational tempo of future military operations increases and as vast amounts of battlefield information become instantly available to commanders through information technology, the traditional manual methods of updating the relevant common picture will not meet the future information processing needs of commanders. The simulation model approach for determining the size and composition of a 21st century tactical staff organized for information operations is discussed next.
MODELING APPROACH
In early 1995, the Operations Research Center of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, and the Army Digitization Office (ADO), Headquarters, Department of the Army began a collaborative effort to develop a computer simulation model for conducting the types of studies described above in Section 1. The goal being to develop a robust simulation model for the ADO capable of performing repetitive analyses, in a timely manner, of dynamic issues supporting FORCE XXI Army Warfighting Experiments (AWES).
The initial phase of model development has focused on establishing a general, baseline simulation model of some of the important tactical command and control functions, processes, procedures and systems currently being used by tactical units in the field. These have been identified through interviews with officers from division staffs, field operating agencies such as the US Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) and the Army Battle Laboratories. For example, the TACLAN system briefly described serves as the baseline for modeling the electronic communication system for the division's information pipeline between commanders and staffs. This effort also includes collecting data on the type and quantity of messages routinely handled by tactical commanders and staffs during command post, field and real-world exercises. The reader is referred to (McGinnis et a1 1995) for a discussion of commander's battlefield information requirements and a summary of recent literature related to this topic.
Following this, experiments will be conducted to reengineer the current division headquarters (commander and staff) into a FORCE XXI C2 System that integrates four separate, yet highly interdependent cqmponents of C2: (1) command and staff functions; (2) C processes; (3) C41z systems; and (4) people. The C2 System will be capable of conducting all of the military operations and all of the environments listed above in Section 2. Adjustments to the baseline computer simulation model will enable it to be used to study alternative communications and information technologies and to conduct tradeoff analyses on the type and number of staff personnel required for information operations given various distributions on the types and quantity of message traffic. 
Assumptions and Modeling Distributions
The development of a baseline simulation model of the current command and control system accounts for some elements of the seven battlefield operating systems. These are: maneuver, fire support, mobilitycountermobility-survivability, air defense, combat service support and command and control. Several examples illustrating how distributions for battlefield systems and processes were determined are given below.
Although TACLAN supports some command and staff functions, interviews with division staff officers and after action reviews (AARs) of recent training exercises revealed there is very little historical data available on tactical message traffic. Furthermore, the data that does exist is poorly documented and of questionable value. Officers recently interviewed from active duty divisions estimated between 3,000 and 3,500 electronic messages may be received within a 24 hour period at division main command posts during a "typical" tactical exercise.
Many messages are generated from intelligence sources relaying information about enemy forces, dispositions, and possible intentions. For example, it was estimated that some intelligence sources generate as many as 100 messages per hour. Several after action reports documented approximately 6,000 unread messages left in queue at the end of a 72 hour division-level command post exercise. Obviously, some important information was not available to commanders for decision making.
Given these types of problems, several simplifying assumptions were needed in formulating distributions for modeling the C2 nodes of the baseline simulation model. These included distributions for message inputs, the types of messages, message queues and message processing time. Based on the interview responses, ten message arrivals / staff node / hour was assumed. Obviously, some nodes will receive more messages per hour and others less, however, on average this seems to be fairly representative of most staff nodes observed. Identification of a real-world distribution of data flowing into a node has not been possible due to the lack of data. Therefore, in the absence of real-world data, the exponential distribution was chosen for modeling this process. Future efforts will focus on collecting actual interarrival data to accurately determine a more appropriate distribution.
Similarly, identification of a distribution for message processing time also suffers from a lack of real-world data. However, interviews with staff officers having recent real-world experience at processing messages at division command posts established a lower bound of twenty seconds for opening and processing electronic messages (i.e., e-mail). The average message processing time for the officers interviewed was approximately three minutes. However, there was much less certainty concerning the upper bound time for message processing. The interview values ranged from five to thirty minutes with the variability depending on the type of message and the type of staff position. Given this, a triangular distribution of T(0.33, 3.0, x) has been selected for message processing time where the maximum message processing time (x) in the distribution is an input parameter varying according to the type of message and staff function being modeled. 
Building the Simulation Model
The baseline simulation model is being built, one C2 node at a time, using ProModel for Windows simulation software. The commander and staff C2 nodes are currently modeled as first-in first-out (FIFO) single servers with message interarrivals exponentially distributed and message processing time follows a triangular distribution as described above. Processing time delays are also incorporated into the model. Building a baseline metu-model of the C2 system one node at a time makes the task of verifying and validating the model more straightforward. Several performance measures have been selected for model verification and validation. These include the number of messages remaining in queue, processing time per message, total processing time and estimating various system costs (in dollars) such as the cost per message as a function message transactions and total system costs. These performance measures may be used in subsequent experiments to compare the FORCE X X I C2 System alternatives against the current baseline system.
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
To date, approximately fifty two separate experiments have been conducted using the prototype simulation model.
These experiments investigate various relationships between the system measures of performance and operating parameters. For example, the relationship between the number of messages left in queue and message arrival rate was studied by varying the mean interarrival time (from one to thirteen minutes) and maximum message processing time (from five to thirty minutes). Each experiment was replicated thirty times. Figure 4 The inverse relationship shown in Figure 4 between messages left in queue and message interarrival time may be interpreted as the message processing rate (i.e., the inverse of the exponential distribution used for message interarrival times). From these results, it is possible to solve for the slope and y-intercept as a function of the message arrival rate and maximum message service time. These linear relationships can then be used to predict the number of remaining messages at a given node at the end of a simulated exercise.
Future experiments will compare these results to realworld message traffic from command post exercises to validate the baseline model. Following this, the computer simulation model will be modified to depict possible configurations of the FORCE XXI C2 system. Table 2 illustrates a possible C2 system configuration.
Automating these types of command and staff functions requires additional data that is not available at this time.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Future combat operations will rely more heavily upon information operations. As the Army continues its move towards a command structure organized around information, it is becoming clearer that the traditional staff organization is unsuitable. The work detailed in this paper demonstrates that a fundamental reorganization of the staff coupled with a simulationbased study of possible alternatives wiil be greatly beneficial to the Army in redesigning its C structure for FORCE XXI. Upcoming tactical exercises should provide data to validate the baseline model.
